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LISTS OF VARIABLES, SUBSCRIPTS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
 
Variables Description Units 
A Surface area m2 
BWS Baseline Water Stress - 
DFMZ Inverted distance from centroids of counties to centroids of ethnic territories m
-1 
DSI Drought Severity Index - 
EFMZ Population density of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa tribes m
-2 
M Original DSI in raw data - 
N Sample size - 
Noil Number of oil production sites - 
Poil Percentage of the county overlapping with oil concession areas - 
Pop Population - 
r Pearson correlation coefficient - 
R2 Coefficient of determination - 
SCI Soil Competition Index m-2 
y Dependent variable (measure for the severity of violence) - 
Zcomparison Z-Scores for comparing Pearson correlation coefficients - 
β Regression coefficient - 
φ Percentage of destroyed structures per village - 
 
Subscripts Description 
FMZ of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa origin 
j Village 
m  Collection of villages in county i 
i County 
 
4 
 
 
  
Abbreviation Description 
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan 
DPA Darfur Peace Agreement 
FMZ Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa 
GIS Geographic information system 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICID International Committee of Inquiry into Darfur 
JEM Justice and Equality Movement 
SLA Sudan Liberation Army 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
VIF Variance Inflation Factor 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Far from Sudan’s heartland on the Nile and only linked to the country’s capital Khartoum with 
an endless dirt road lies the region Darfur, which literally translates as ‘home of the Fur.’ The 
deserts of North Darfur, the hills of East Darfur, the wadis of West Darfur and the mountain 
massif of Central Darfur conjointly approximate the size of Spain, but only inhabited around a 
tenth of Spain’s population in 2003; four to six million people. The vast majority of them are 
Muslim, but the province is a mosaic of Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups.1 The Fur are, 
together with the Massaleit and Zaghawa, the largest non-Arab groups. Besides these three 
groups, there are relatively newer non-Arab tribes, who have been neutral in the recent conflict.2 
Some lines between the Arab and non-Arab tribes blurred. Although many of the non-Arab 
groups have their own indigenous language, many speak Arabic too. 3  While their main 
occupation is sedentary agriculture and the majority of Arab groups herd cattle and are nomadic, 
over the years many Fur have also acquired cattle. In addition, the skin tone of the non-Arab 
and Arab tribes are indistinguishable and individuals can often switch tribes via marriage in just 
a single generation. 
Background  
This ethnic mix of people has faced many political problems since its independence from the 
United Kingdom and Egypt in 1956. Two civil wars between the central government in 
Khartoum and separatists in the south of Sudan devastated the country between 1955 and 1972 
and between 1983 and 2005, eventually leading to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in 
2011. In the midst of this violence, Omar al-Bashir rose to power through a coup in 1989 and 
remained in power ever since, ruling autocratically with a strong underpinning of Islamism and 
Arab supremacy, which has brutally excluded non-Arab Darfurians from roles in the regime. 
Darfur always had a troubled relationship with Sudan and its central government in Khartoum. 
After an autonomous period as a sultanate from 1600, Darfur was incorporated into Sudan in 
1916. Soon afterwards, Darfur was increasingly marginalised and exploited. 4  This 
marginalisation created tensions between ethnic groups in Darfur. In the 1980s already, 
droughts and the resulting famine had fuelled violence between Fur and Arab groups in Darfur 
                                                 
1 A term coined by: Marco Boggero, "Darfur and Chad: A Fragmented Ethnic Mosaic," Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 1 (2009). 
2 Ola Olsson and Michele Valsecchi, "Quantifying Ethnic Cleansing: An Application to Darfur,"  (2010): 11. 
3 See: Heather J Sharkey, "Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race," African Affairs 107, no. 426 
(2008). 
4 John Hagan and Joshua Kaiser, "The Displaced and Dispossessed of Darfur: Explaining the Sources of a Continuing State‐ Led Genocide," 
The British Journal of Sociology 62, no. 1 (2011). 
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as migration fluxes into fertile areas escalated resource scarcity.5 The violence intensified further 
as Gaddafi’s Libya supplied arms to Arab herders in Darfur to advance pan-Arabism and 
Islamism into Sudan. 6  With this conflict and with later marginalisation, the ethnic mosaic 
increasingly turned into an Arab versus non-Arab dichotomy. 
The conflicts between Fur and Arab tribes never fully resolved. Low-level warfare remained 
endemic to the region until it escalated into another tribal war between Massaleit and Arab 
tribes from 1995 to 1999. Meanwhile, anxiety amongst the non-Arabs grew further as Arab 
militias gained political influence and impunity.7 In 2003, this low-level warfare intensified again 
towards a full-scale war and genocide in Darfur.  
Most narratives of the war in Darfur start with the attack by the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) 
and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on an airport at al Fashar in April 2003, where 
the SLA and JEM had secured weapons and vehicles for the violence to come.8 A few months 
after this attack, the violence escalated further as Omar al-Bashir ordered attacks on the region 
as a response to the rebel’s attack. Government officials urged the Janjaweed, a militia that 
mainly recruits from Arab tribes and that had received al-Bashir’s support in the forms of arms 
and money before,9 to increase the recruitment of militiamen from June 2003.10 After this public 
endorsement, Musa Hilal, the leader of the Janjaweed, repeatedly expressed his intent to 
eliminate all non-Arabs from Darfur. 11  The tactics were clear, Sudanese aircraft bombings 
preceded the Janjaweed’s rape, loot, killings and destructions. Between February 2003 and April 
2006 alone, the violence killed around 235.000 people. Indirect damage, through starvation and 
diarrhoea, killed another 200.000 people at the same time.12 Additionally, over six million people 
fled their homes. The majority of refugees has no prospect of returning to their villages and 
their refugee camps have slowly transformed into permanent cities as the war continues.13 
The international community’s response was inadequate. The African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) in April 2005 and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 both failed to de-escalate 
the conflict. AMIS could not offer Darfurians protection. The Sudanese bombing of two rebel 
villages, a few days after the head of the African Union’s peacekeeping force had visited, 
                                                 
5 See: Alex De Waal, Famine That Kills: Darfur, Sudan (New York: Oxford University Press 1989). 
6 Hagan and Kaiser,  5. 
7 John Ryle, "Disaster in Darfur," New York Review of Books 51, no. 13 (2004). 
8 Jess Gifkins, "Darfur," in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, ed. Alex Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), 718. 
9 The evidence for ties between Janjaweed and the Sudanese government are irrefutable and summarised in several reports of the Human Rights 
Watch, for the best report, see: "Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur,"  (Human Rights Watch, 
2005). 
10 Hagan and Kaiser,  6. 
11 John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
12 Olivier Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir, "Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict," The Lancet 375 (2010): 295. 
13 Paul Jeffrey and Annie Bungeroth, "In Pictures: Darfur Refugees Then and Now," BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28739000. 
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exemplifies this inability and, additionally, aggravated the distrust between Darfurians and 
foreign military forces.14  
The underlying reason for the late response of the international community was that the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) was held in a stalemate as China only voted for resolutions 
that required Sudanese consent. In August 2006, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1706. The 
resolution would enforce the DPA via deployment of 22.500 peace-support personnel to Darfur. 
However, eight months later, only 200 technical personnel were deployed. The UNSC 
Resolution 1706 basically gave Khartoum’s regime a veto power over the deployment of a force 
charged with halting the genocide executed by that same regime.15 China’s U-turn only occurred 
as the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing approached.16 International advocacy persuaded 
China to vote in favour of UNSC Resolution 1769, which fully authorised the deployed of 
23.000 personnel to Darfur from August 2007 onwards. Although violence was impeded to 
some extent and an important peace agreement was signed in May 2011, violence often 
reawakens and continues to destroy lives until this day.  
Outline 
In the light of the atrocities in Darfur, scholars have suggested several causes of the violence. 
Scholars have focused on four theories to explain the violence in Darfur: ethnicity, resource 
scarcity, counter-insurgency and intra-elite rivalry. But until now, it remains unclear which 
explanation has more explanatory power. This thesis aims to shed light on the relative 
importance of two of these alternative explanations, via a statistical analysis of geo-coded data 
on Darfur’s counties using a geographic information system (GIS) and a unique dataset 
compiled out of a large variety of publicly available data. On the basis of a thorough scan of 
available data, this thesis focuses solely on ethnic tension and resource scarcity as explanations 
for the violence in Darfur. Simply put, the main research question is: which of two explanations, 
ethnicity or resource scarcity, contributed more to the root causes of the violence in Darfur?   
  
                                                 
14 See: Willa Thayer, "Sudan Bombs Rebel Areas in Darfur after Au Peacekeeper Visit," the Independent, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/sudan-bombs-rebel-areas-in-darfur-after-au-peacekeeper-visit-430459.html.  
15 Eric Reeves, "Getting Darfur Wrong," Dissent 56, no. 4 (2009). 
16 Ibid. 
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To answer this question, two linear regression models are designed. The performed linear 
regressions statistically correlate quantifiable and observable implications of the two alternative 
explanations to the dependent variable: the spatial variation of the severity of violence within 
Darfur. The statistical units of this data analysis are the sixty-three counties of Darfur. The 
accuracy and predictive strength of each model quantifies the explanatory power of the two 
theories, thereby answering the main question.  
Concerning the two explanations, the reading of literature puts forward four hypotheses: the 
severity of violence increases with (i) the population density of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa 
tribes in each county, (ii) with the proximity of counties to the centre of ethnic territories, (iii) 
with the resource scarcity in each county and (iv) with the presence of oil in each county. The 
first two hypotheses (i and ii) fall under the umbrella of the explanation regarding ethnic 
tensions while the last two (iii and iv) relate to the view that the Darfur genocide was primarily a 
struggle over resources.   
The wide variety of used data and the chosen geographical approach makes this research a fresh 
addition to existing literature. No other empirical research has attempted to analyse the entire 
area of Darfur while simultaneously shedding light on different explanations.17 In addition, no 
other study uses micro-level data to describe the region. Finally, in literature, qualitative 
methods are primarily compared rival explanations while statistical methods primarily verified 
the validity of single explanations. Therefore, the application of statistical methods to compare 
alternative explanations offers a unique opportunity. This wide scope might elucidate previously 
unobservable patterns.   
  
                                                 
17 Ola Olsson tested ethnic tensions and resource scarcity with a more limited set of data that also only described in around five percent of 
Darfur: Ola Olsson and Eyerusalem Siba, "Ethnic Cleansing or Resource Struggle in Darfur? An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Development 
Economics 103 (2013). 
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Many have seen the relevance of studying genocides before this research; the war in Darfur is 
the subject of hundreds of books, speeches, reviews and news articles. A better understanding 
of the causes and dynamics of genocide is relevant in several ways. Firstly, it can help prevent 
future atrocities by identifying risk factors and indicators early on. Thereby the case of Darfur 
can be an important lesson for the international community on how (not) to act. Additionally, 
during the international response to war, understanding the process and causes of genocide can 
help humanitarian organisations and peace-keeping missions to target their aid effectively and 
safely. Furthermore, this research produces a visually appealing way to explain causes of the 
violence in Darfur, which could be used as a tool for educational purposes. Finally, clearly 
identified patterns of genocide can serve as paramount evidence for a more widely accepted 
declaration of genocide and prosecution of its culprits.  
The remainder of this paper first elaborates on all the alternative explanations in academics. A 
preliminary examination of available data then shows that only the influence of ethnic tensions 
and resource scarcity on violence is suitable for testing. The chapter on research design then 
elaborates further on how these explanations are tested and how these tests answer the research 
question. The research design also identifies the observable implications of each theory and how 
these implications quantified into analysable variables. It also addresses the scope of the 
research, the statistical strategy and all its limitations. The final chapters analyse the results of 
the designed linear regressions and draw conclusion from the observations.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The Darfur genocide has the perverse honour of being the most fully chronicled genocide since 
the Holocaust. The hundreds of human rights reports, newspaper articles, governmental 
investigations, accounts of non-governmental agencies, reports of aid workers, research papers 
and policy recommendations show a relative conformity around key themes.  
Although it has taken years to form this consensus and there still are many dissenting voices,18 
there is now a broad academic agreement about the role of the Sudanese government in the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of six million Darfurians, 19 
overwhelmingly from the non-Arab tribal populations of the region. This consensus further 
strengthened in July 2010 through the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for 
Omar al-Bashir on the count of genocide. However, the ICC’s warrant failed to solve Darfur’s 
problem as it demonised the regime so that agreements between the regime and rebels became 
virtually impossible.20 Despite dissenting voices, this thesis refrains from joining the legal, and 
often semantic, debate on the use of term ‘genocide’ and defines the atrocities in Darfur as 
genocide.21   
Apart from this debate on Darfur’s genocide, the causes of this genocide are heavily debated 
too. Four explanatory factors dominate the academic debate: ethnicity, resource scarcity, 
counter-insurgency and intra-elite rivalry. As this reading of the literature argues, all the 
explanations roughly fit into a single narrative. The explanations that fit into this narrative do 
not inherently contradict their alternatives; they are simply true on different levels. For example, 
ethnicity can co-exist with, or even have a correlation to the rebellion. The Darfur genocide is, 
therefore, a typical case of overdetermination. This overdetermination also creates the 
confusion and the difficulties in determining the relative importance of alternative explanations. 
The following literature review aims to untangle explanations into clear categories. 
  
                                                 
18 The U.N. and the African Union for instance still refrain from using the term ‘genocide’ as prove for ‘genocidal intent’ was limited in their 
eyes.  
19 Reeves. 
20 Martin Shaw, "Darfur: Counter‐ Insurgency, Forced Displacement and Genocide," The British Journal of Sociology 62, no. 1 (2011). 
21 The genocide debate focuses on if genocide must originate from a genocidal intent, or if genocide can also occur as a side effect of a counter-
insurgency. The debate has been further characterised by idea that genocide per se entails mass murder and not forced displacement, see: Alex De 
Waal, "Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap," Review of African Political Economy 31, no. 102 (2004); Hagan and Kaiser. For some more reflections on 
the genocide debate, see: SMH Jennifer Leaning MD, "Diagnosing Genocide-the Case of Darfur," The New England journal of medicine 351, no. 8 
(2004); David Luban, "Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word, Darfur, and the Un Report," Chicago Journal of International Law 7, 
no. 1 (2006); Scott Straus, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005); Mika Vehnämäki, "Darfur Scorched: Looming 
Genocide in Western Sudan " Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 1 (2006). 
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Ethnicity 
Firstly, ideology would explain why the never-ending marginalisation of Darfurians, as much of 
Darfur’s population differs ethnically from the Arab regime in Khartoum. Because Sudanese 
and Darfurians are all Muslim, it is not a religion but the ethnicity based on Arabism that 
explains the centuries-old tensions and the current conflict. Ryle argued that the internal history 
of conflict “between ethnic groups in Darfur is one of Balkan complexity.”22 Scholars subscribe 
to this conclusion, referring to historic ethnicity in Darfur as a mosaic rather than a binary 
polarised society between Arabs and Africans.23  
The explanation of ethnicity works on different levels as Arabism has affected both the beliefs 
of the national leader, Omar al-Bashir, and the interaction between tribes within Darfur. 
Additionally, ethnicity plays a role in the root causes of the conflict and in the rollout of the 
actual violence.  
Ethnic divisions ignited centuries ago, as Ta’rib or Arabisation gradually spread through Sudan, 
slowly propagating the Arab identity and language into remote regions as Darfur. This Arab 
supremacist ideology spread further during Gaddafi’s campaigns to unify Libya, Chad and 
Sudan in the 1980s.24 In close collaboration with the Arab Um Julal tribe, this Libyan campaign 
created the Arab Gathering, an “Islamist militantly racist and pan-Arabist organisation that later 
supplied the founders of the Janjaweed.”25 The Um Julal again are a part of the Abbala (camel-
herding) Rizeigat tribe, whose quarrels with the Fur date back to the Fur Sultanate of the 
seventeenth century when.26 The old Sultan divided Darfur’s land. Known as hawakir, these 
territorial grants are the basis of today’s ethnic land divisions. The Abbala Rizeigat, the ethnic 
base of Janjaweed, still ascribes their role in the conflict to them not receiving territory over 
three hundred years ago.27 This shows the relevance of Darfur’s ethnic history in the recent 
genocide. 
Ethnicity and Arabism also plays a role on a larger scale. Sudan’s government has consequently 
marginalised the population of Darfur along ethnic lines. Since his coup in 1989, Omar al-
Bashir has mostly appointed Arab officials. The government often altered borders to make the 
                                                 
22 Ryle. 
23 Alex De Waal, "Deep Down in Darfur: Nothing Is as We Are Told in Sudan's Killing Fields," review of Darfur: the Ambigious Genocide by 
Gerard Prunier, Review of African Political Economy 32, no. 106 (2005): 658. 
24 Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, Darfur: A New History of a Long War, ed. Julie Flint and Alex De Waal, African Arguments (London: Zed Books, 
2008), 47 - 50. 
25 Gerard Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 45. 
26 De Waal, "Deep Down in Darfur: Nothing Is as We Are Told in Sudan's Killing Fields," 654. 
27 Ibid. 
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Fur the minority in each Darfurian states,28 which gave the ancient struggle for land and power 
an ethnic element.29 Later, Khartoum even did away with hereditary rights to land and disarmed 
non-Arab villages, further unbalancing Darfur’s Arab and non-Arab populations. 30 Medani 
specifically argued that these kinds of “Islamist-backed regime’s policies in the 1990s ultimately 
led to the conflict in Darfur.”31 One manuscript that significantly contributed to the rebellion’s 
appeal, the Black Book, clearly stipulates the effects that these policies had. The Black Book showed 
that Darfur scores far worse on representation, funding, health care, education and infant 
mortality than other regions do.32 Apart from within the region, ethnicity and Arab supremacy 
thus also heavily influenced the behaviour of the regime in Khartoum towards non-Arab groups 
in Darfur.  
The ethnicity thus played a strong role in the run-up to the war in Darfur, but it echoes through 
in the targets of the actual violence as well. Olsson and Valsecchi studied the violence in a small 
part of Darfur, accounting for 12 percent of Darfur’s total population.33 They found that 57 
percent of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa were cleansed from their villages, indicating a rather 
‘successful’ cleansing. In addition, 85 percent of the cleansed population also had their village 
destroyed. This violence caused the relative population of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa in that 
part of Darfur to drop from 70 percent to 47 percent in five years. Several other quantitative 
studies confirm these findings. 34  In addition, scholars have found that the Janjaweed 
consistently used racial epithets during the raids, often shouting, “We will kill any slaves we find 
and cut off their heads!” or “This is the last day for blacks!” and “You blacks are not human. 
We can do anything we want to you. You cannot live here!”35 The statistics and the racial 
epithets show that that racism and ideology were not only at the root of the conflict but form an 
important motivation for individual practitioners of violence.  
Overall, these regional and national dynamics also show how ideology intrinsically links to 
power-maximisation. In the regime’s goal of annihilating the rebellion and further suppressing 
the Darfurians, the Janjaweed found a vicious opening to combine their own political and ethnic 
agenda with the agenda of the central government. Furthermore, the regime adheres to Arab 
supremacy in name, but Ryle pointed out it had already “purged itself of some of the hard-core 
                                                 
28 Khalid Mustafa Medani, review of Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 42 no. 1 (2010): 175. 
29 Martin W Daly, Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244. 
30 Reeves. 
31 Medani. 
32 Alex Cobham, "Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing the Black Book," The European Journal of Development Research 17, no. 3 (2005). 
33 Olsson and Valsecchi. 
34 John Hagan, Wemona Rymond-Richmond, and Patricia Parker, "The Criminology of Genocide: The Death and Rape of Darfur," Criminology 
43, no. 3 (2005); Michael Vanrooyen et al., "Employment of a Livelihoods Analysis to Define Genocide in the Darfur Region of Sudan," Journal 
of Genocide Research 10, no. 3 (2008). 
35 John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond, "The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal Victimization in Darfur," 
American Sociological Review 73, no. 6 (2008): 882. 
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ideologues that had guided it until the late 1990s.”36 As Shaw concludes, apart from ethnic goals, 
the regional militia and the national leaders seemed “rational actors pursuing (inhuman) political 
goals.”37 Although there are many ideological and ethnic features to the conflict, it remains hard 
to distinguish an ideological agenda from a political one. 
Resource scarcity 
The second explanation, which received significant attention after a report of the United 
Nations Environment Programme and an essay by Jeffrey Sachs, proposes that climate change, 
land degradation and the resulting competition over natural resources as water and food is the 
root cause of the conflict.38 Interestingly, the government of Sudan has consistently promoted 
this narrative as well.  
The impact of changes in the water-food-climate nexus on the war in Darfur is twofold. Firstly, 
resource scarcity has started exacerbating ethnic tensions within Darfur decades before the 
conflict. Scholars argue that Arab nomads and non-Arab farmers had co-existed peacefully for 
years as land was abundant and local authorities adequately resolved conflicts.39 Tensions grew 
after the Unregistered Land Act of 1970, which did away with the traditional land rule and put 
ownership of all unregistered land into the hands of the government. This meant that new tribes 
could settle anywhere while previously they were merely welcomed as guests of the hosting 
tribe.40 This Unregistered Land Act thus especially benefited Arab nomads at the expense of 
sedentary, non-Arab landowners. The act also diminished the legitimacy of traditional courts, 
increasing the appeal of violence to resolve conflicts. 
The pressure on land only grew further in the following years. In the 1980s, droughts, 
desertification and rapid population growth caused a famine that resulted in mass migration 
fluxes towards more fertile grounds. After the destructive famine, Arab tribesmen and semi-
sedentary Fur communities violently clashed in an even more destructive war over resources.41 
The central government also used the resource scarcity to further marginalise Darfurians, as the 
destructive damages of droughts and famines could have been diminished with only minimal 
governmental competence in Khartoum.42 According to Prunier, these were “the first signs of 
enmities between nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes in Darfur that set the stage for the violent 
                                                 
36 Ryle,  57. 
37 Shaw,  60. 
38 Jeffrey D Sachs, "Ecology and Political Upheaval," Scientific American 295, no. 1 (2006).; "Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment ",  
(Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, 2007). 
39 Musa Adam Abdul-Jalil, "The Dynamics of Customary Land Tenure and Natural Resource Management in Darfur," Land Reform FAO, no. 2 
(2006). 
40 Ibid., 18. 
41 Medani,  175. 
42 Jeffrey Kaplan, "A Review Of: Gerard Prunier. Darfur: The Ambigious Genocide"," Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 146 - 148 (2007). 
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conflict in Darfur.”43 Prunier added that the schism between nomadic and sedentary tribes was 
later superimposed on an Arab versus African dichotomy.44 This shows how ethnic tensions and 
violence originate from resource scarcity.  
The central government has also heavily invested in securing oil resources in the region. 
Although there is hardly any oil in production in Darfur, rumours about the widespread 
presence of oil have exacerbated tensions in the region.45  
Another side of the explanation focuses on how capturing land and access to water played a role 
in the Janjaweed’s rollout of the violence. Hagan and Kaiser argued that the chance to “take 
land from Black African farming groups played an explicit part in the mobilisation and training 
of the militias.” 46  Vanrooyen added that after the Janjaweed had raided a village, “nothing 
remains on the surface to mark the boundaries of fields and generations of cultivation that 
defined the farm holdings,”47 giving militiamen the opportunity to reclaim the land. He also 
showed that theft of livestock was a primary aim of the Janjaweed.48  However, if scarcity 
contributed to the violence in Darfur and capturing resources was an aim of the Janjaweed, it is 
hard to explain why the Janjaweed deliberately poisoned wells, destroyed food stores and 
uprooted trees.49 
Although many scholars have qualitatively tied resource scarcity to violence,50 the statistical 
evidence for a link between resource scarcity and violence is inconclusive. One study found no 
evidence for a correlation between violence and changes in vegetation,51 while another study did 
proof that same correlation.52 Yet another study showed that trends in rainfall only weakly 
correlated with the outbreak of violence.53 However, all these scholars fail to take into the full 
scope of elements of environmental degradation. Population growth (human and animal), 
changes in agriculture and cattle breeding, use of water for irrigation and ground water 
salinisation are all important, and neglected, aspects of environmental degradation. Collectively, 
these components might expose the correlation between environment and violence.  
                                                 
43 Prunier. 
44 Ibid., 162. 
45 Andrea Behrends, "Fighting for Oil When There Is No Oil Yet: The Darfur-Chad Border," European Journal of Anthropology 2008, no. 52 (2008). 
46 Hagan and Kaiser,  7. 
47 Vanrooyen et al.,  352. 
48 Ibid., 351.  
49 Hagan and Kaiser,  10. 
50 See for instance: Flint and De Waal. 
51 Ian Brown, "Assessing Eco-Scarcity as a Cause of the Outbreak of Conflict in Darfur: A Remote Sensing Approach," International Journal of 
Remote Sensing 31, no. 10 (2010). 
52 Alexander De Juan, "Long-Term Environmental Change and Geographical Patterns of Violence in Darfur, 2003–2005," Political Geography 45 
(2015). 
53 Michael Kevane and Leslie Gray, "Darfur: Rainfall and Conflict," Environmental Research Letters 3, no. 3 (2008). 
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Finally, De Waal gives concludes that “depleted natural resources and livelihood 
transformations cannot on their own account for armed conflict.” 54  Just like all other 
explanations, an explanation solely focusing on one cause - the resource scarcity in Darfur in 
this case - oversimplifies the conflict and does not do justice to the political and historical reality 
of the region.  
Counter-insurgency 
The third explanation perceives the genocide as a counter-insurgency warfare, and thus as a 
reaction to the attacks to the government’s military bases.  
A report of The International Committee of Inquiry into Darfur (ICID) concluded that “those 
who planned and organised attacks on villages pursued the intent to drive the victims from their 
homes, primarily for purposes of counter-insurgency warfare.” 55  Additionally, via the 
ruthlessness in Darfur, Sudan’s regime could discourage insurgents in the east of Sudan, where 
rebels already controlled a large enclave on the Eritrean frontier.56 De Waal subscribes that 
conclusion and notes that since time immemorial, “the Sudan government’s strategy for 
pursuing its counter-insurgency has set every major campaign down a particular path.”57 He 
exemplifies this with the counter-insurgency of 1985 when due to “the huge financial costs of 
mobilising the army, the political unpopularity of the draft, and the uncertain loyalty of many 
army officers, the government made the fateful decision to use proxy militia.”58 Five other 
Sudanese counter-insurgency operations have embarked on the same path. For similar reasons 
as in 1985, Sudan chose the same path to curb the rebellion in Darfur. Sudan’s involvement in 
South Sudan already drove their army to the extreme, pushing financial and social limits. An 
additional draft for an unpopular and costly war in Darfur would face hostility from Sudan’s 
population. Therefore, the Sudanese government partnered with the Janjaweed, creating the 
latest addition to the traditional counter-insurgencies. 
Sceptics of the explanatory power of counter-insurgency demonstrate how the alleged counter-
insurgency operation in Darfur does not fit into accepted models of counter-insurgencies. 
According to these general theories, counter-insurgencies are aimed selectively towards the 
civilian base of rebel groups.59 However, violence in Darfur was aimed at non-Arab civilians 
indiscriminately. Additionally, the regimes’ response was not proportionate to the rebel’s attacks. 
                                                 
54 Alex de Waal, as quoted in: Declan Butler, "Darfur's Climate Roots Challenged," Nature 447, no. 1038 (2007). 
55 "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General ",  (Geneva: United Nations, 2005), 4. 
56 Ryle,  62. 
57 Alex De Waal, "Reflections on the Difficulties of Defining Darfur's Crisis as Genocide," Harvard Human Rights Journal 20 (2007): 27. 
58 Ibid., 28. 
59 For an important overview, see: Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, "“Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla 
Warfare," International Organization 58, no. 02 (2004). 
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These seeming inconsistencies between practice and theory are easily parried because Darfur’s 
violence was born out of an alliance between the government and a militia. This compromise 
between political and ethnic goals of the Janjaweed and the counter-insurgency interests of the 
central government explains the ‘ineffectiveness’ of the violence. The characteristics of this 
compromise clearly resemble characteristics of previous Sudanese counter-insurgencies.60   
Statistical studies do are not conclusive about the applicability of the theory on counter-
insurgency either. Hagan critiqued the relevance of counter-insurgency by concluding that 
“there is no or little evidence from surveys to support … that the attacks have been directed at 
rebel groups as a counter-insurgency strategy.”61 In a study of a small region in Darfur, he 
observes that sites of rebel presence do not correlate with sites of violence.62 This, however, 
does not imply that crushing the insurgents was not a prime aim of Sudan’s regime. The regime 
has repeatedly bombed places where rebel leaders have met to hammer out differences, clearly 
showing that the violence was also specifically focused on crushing and disorganising the 
rebellion.63 This disruption of the rebel’s organisation continuously inhibited peace talks, as 
rebels were internally divided and thus did not have a strong negotiating position towards the 
Sudanese government. The observed, and more comprehensive, violence of the Janjaweed also 
crushed the insurgents, but with a lot of collateral damage. As Hagan fails to acknowledge, the 
missing correlation between rebel presence and violence can be explained via the characteristics 
of the alliance between the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed; for the government of 
Sudan, crushing the insurgents was only possible by allowing the Janjaweed agency over the 
execution of the violence.  
  
                                                 
60 Shaw. 
61 Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker,  525. 
62 Hagan and Kaiser. 
63 Eric Reeves, "Genocide without End?: The Destruction of Darfur," Dissent 54, no. 3 (2007): 10. 
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Intra-elite rivalry 
The fourth explanation relates closely to the arguments for counter-insurgency warfare. As van 
der Maat first proposed, elites often use the momentum of genocides to strengthen their own 
pillars of support and purge intra-elite rivals. 64  Hassan al-Turabi, the vice-president and an 
influential Islamist thinker, was such an intra-elite rival of Omar al-Bashir. Al-Turabi aspired to 
expand the Arab identity beyond the elites in Khartoum, into the rest of Sudan.65 He had 
inflamed the sentiment against al-Bashir, who allegedly thought African Darfurians could never 
belong to the Arab ethnicity. Later, Al-Bashir accused Al-Turabi of having ties with JEM.66 Al-
Bashir explicitly blamed al-Turabi for inciting the rebellion and escalating the war in Darfur. The 
Sudanese dictator closed al-Turabi’s party and had him imprisoned several times in the 2000s, 
which gradually eroded his power in Sudanese politics.67 The International Crisis Group even 
argued that the power-struggle between al-Turabi and al-Bashir “for control over the Islamist 
movement and the country was being played out in Darfur.”68 Current research studies if al-
Bashir used the Darfur genocide to purge rivalling voices from the central government and if 
the Darfur genocide fits into van der Maat’s general theory of genocidal consolidation.  
In conclusion, all presented literature has its strengths and weaknesses. Yet these explanations 
cannot be analysed separately as each proposed dynamic an explanation influences, or at least 
interfaces, with dynamics of other explanations. If taken collectively, the literature fits into a 
single narrative. The four theories suggest that the Darfur genocide was a counter-insurgency 
campaign against rebels, which simultaneously had the political purpose of ruining the 
reputation of political opponents of al-Bashir. This campaign took on massive dimensions due 
to the ethnic history of Darfur; economically, environmentally and socially marginalised tribes in 
the periphery fought the well-off elites in Khartoum. This intra-regional conflict affected the 
historical struggle between Arab and non-Arab tribes within the region as well, which has 
intensified over the last decades due to dwindling natural resources. As explanations are not 
mutually exclusive, the Darfur genocide is a typical case of overdetermination.  
                                                 
64  For a full version of van der Maat’s theory, see: Eelco van der Maat, "Genocidal Consolidation: Final Solutions to Elite Rivalry,"  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2665673. 
65 Alex De Waal, "Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and African Identities, Violence and External Engagement," African affairs 104, no. 415 (2005): 
191. 
66 Yehudit Ronen, "The Rise and Fall of Hasan Abdallah Al-Turabi: A Unique Chapter in Sudan's Political History (1989–99)," Middle Eastern 
Studies 50, no. 6 (2014): 1001. 
67Ibid.  
68 "Darfur Rising: Sudan's New Crisis,"  in ICG Africa Report (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004), 9. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN  
As the reading of literature showed, weighing and comparing the relative importance of rival 
explanations has proven to be problematic. This thesis aims to determine this relative 
importance through a statistical analysis, to answer to what extent ethnic tensions and resource 
scarcity explains the severity of violence in Darfur. On the basis of publicly available geo-coded 
data, this research design seeks to correlate the alternative explanations’ observable and 
quantifiable implications with spatiotemporal data on episodes of violence. SPSS is the chosen 
software package for all statistical work. QGIS, an open-source GIS software, processes all the 
geographical data.69  
Because the availability of useful geo-coded data is limited and observable implications are not 
easily quantifiable, only two out of the four previously presented theories can be tested: 
genocide as an ethnic conflict and genocide as a struggle over scarce resources. Ethnicity and 
resource scarcity can have interdependencies. The explanations are not mutually exclusive; as an 
example, ruling ethnic groups might have located themselves around the most fertile lands. 
Retrospective analysis of these linear interdependencies is a key aspect of result interpretation.   
The chosen method brings strong advantages; a statistical study offers an objective way of 
comparing explanations while simultaneously avoiding a collection of qualitative examples as 
the circumstantial evidence for a single theory. Furthermore, using GIS and geo-coded data 
offers a unique combination of usable data and easy processing of large amounts of data.  
One of the gravest limitations to this study is the limited availability of data, which affects the 
research design in several ways. Firstly, the limited availability of geo-coded data on Darfur fuels 
the need to approximate observable implications and to make assumptions of varying 
acceptability. Decisions on independent variables heavily depend on the availability of data. This 
limited availability often forces us to measure observable implications more deviously. Although 
a lot of valuable data is unavailable, the selected data contains no gaps or missing entries and 
thus describes the entire surface of Darfur, another unique aspect of this analysis.  
The remainder of this chapter first addresses the selection of the to-be-tested theories. The 
statistical strategy then outlines how the statistical analysis can answer the research question. 
The section that follows selects the dependent and independent variables as well and identifies 
the selection and processing of several datatypes: baseline data, data on the dependent variable 
                                                 
69 Elaborate explanations on the workings of these software packages are not presented in this thesis, as they largely depend on the version and 
operating system. Most explanations or manuals can be found online.  
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and data on independent variables. The data on the independent variables quantifies the 
observable implications of the tested theories. The same section hypothesises how variations the 
independent variables influence the dependent variables. These hypotheses are tested in the 
results. The chapter concludes with a short overview of the complete research design, including 
observable implications and the selected methods, scope and data.  
Selection of theories 
Two of the proposed explanations for the Darfur genocide are excluded from this research. 
Firstly, previous statistical studies already scrutinised the view of the genocide as a Sudanese 
counter-insurgency.70 Although these studies have qualitative shortcomings, publicly available 
data cannot mitigate the known flaws. As the review of literature previously argued, Khartoum’s 
aim of the counter-insurgency has been entangled and diluted with the practicality of its 
coalition with the Janjaweed. This entanglement complicates quantification of the observable 
implication of the theory and thus also determination of the importance of counter-insurgency 
in the Darfur genocide.  
Arguably, ethnicity can be an observable implication of the counter-insurgency theory as rebel 
groups mainly recruited from Fur, Massaleit or Zaghawa groups. Yet, this approach cannot 
discriminate between the two theories on ethnicity and on counter-insurgency. Furthermore, it 
would be overly simplistic to denote ethnicity as a variable for counter-insurgency efforts as 
Hagan, Rymond-Richmond and Parker identified a variation of rebel activity between villages 
with similar ethnic composition.71 Combined, these two complications make it infeasible to 
statistically test the importance of counter-insurgency during the Darfur genocide. 
Secondly, the observable implications of intra-elite rivalries, such as attempted coups or sackings, 
arrests or resignation of high-ranking officers within the regime, cannot be quantified to an 
extent that makes data usable for this analysis; there is simply no data on the spatial variation of 
support for al-Bashir or his rivals within Darfur. Intra-elite rivalry therefore remains black-
boxed.  
An initial scan of the availability of data on observable implications showed that the remaining 
two theories are testable. Therefore, this study only focuses on the relevance of ethnic tensions 
and resource scarcity to the Darfur genocide.  
  
                                                 
70 Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker. 
71 Ibid., 548. 
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Statistical strategy  
The statistical strategy is paramount to successfully answering the research question. The 
statistical strategy essentially determines how the selected data is processed and analysed and 
how interpretation of the results can answer the research question.  
The first issue of the statistical strategy is to define the statistical units into which all the selected 
data must be processed.72 Collectively, all statistical units must cover the entire area of Darfur, 
fitting together like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. The aim of data collection and processing is to 
quantify every observable implication into a variable in each statistical unit. The statistical 
analysis is then performed on the complete set of statistical units.  
The number of statistical units must be sufficiently high to form a representative sample size; a 
necessity for obtaining precise results. The units’ surface area units can thus not be too large, as 
the statistical analysis would then become imprecise. However, the surface area of units cannot 
be too small either as the data, which are often published in grid cells, then does not adequately 
describe variations between statistical units. Statistical units of ten square kilometres cannot 
adequately describe variations of data in grid cells of hundred square kilometres. In other words, 
the resolution of the statistical units must roughly match the resolution of the input data. 
The sixty-three counties of Darfur meet these criteria and are therefore selected as the statistical 
units. This choice is beneficial as the number of counties allows for a good statistical evaluation 
and input data is often organised along similar administrative boundaries or, alternatively, 
roughly equally sized grid cells. All the input data must be processed into variables per county. 
Figure 1 shows the location of Darfur’s counties within Sudan.  
                                                 
72 For an overview on statistical units, see: Shaila Nijhowne, "Deﬁning and Classifying Statistical Units," Business Survey Methods 214 (2011).  
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Figure 1: The location of Darfur’s sixty-three counties (in green) within Sudan.   
To generalise conclusions from statistical units to Darfur in its entirety, the study uses two (one 
per explanation) linear regression models with the least squares approach for the fit. These 
linear regressions should find correlations between independent and dependent variables. This 
chapter’s conclusion gives a mathematical overview of the regression models and statistical 
strategy, including all the selected variables. 
A linear regression model is based on two key assumptions, which are validated in hindsight. 
Firstly, the error between the observed and predicted values should be normally distributed. 
Residual plots can assess the normality of errors. These plots also show if a linear model is the 
right choice for the data. In the residual plot, the plotted errors between the data and the 
regression model should be random, not systematic. A second assumption is that linear 
interdependencies, or multicollinearity, within the data is limited. As an indication of 
interdependencies, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score of each variable should be lower 
than three. 
The two regression models thus produce results that allow for comparison of predictive 
strength and accuracy of two sets of variables, corresponding to the observable implications of 
two theories. Yet, it is impossible to directly compare two regressions because the units and 
dimensions of variables vary. To allow for a comparison of the two regressions despite this issue, 
all variables are standardised.73 The standardised value ?̃? =  
𝑥−𝜇
𝜎
, in which μ is the average value 
off x and σ is its standard deviation. Assuming a normal distribution of variables, the 
standardised values should lie between around -4 and +4 for every single variable. The 
                                                 
73 For a basic overview of statistics, and the use of standardisation and Z-scores, see: Timothy C Urdan, Statistics in Plain English (New York: 
Routledge, 2016), 37 - 49. 
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standardisation ensures that results, such as regression coefficients, of the two different 
regression models are comparable. Eventually these results can demonstrate a significant 
difference in predictive strength between the two theories.  
Interpreting the results is key to understanding the practical relevance of the regression models. 
Firstly, the coefficient of determination (R2 value) indicates the average difference between data 
points and the regression model. The closer R2 is to unity, the better the model describes 
variations within the data and the more accurate the model is. For comparison between the 
several regression models, the adjusted R2 will be compared to account for the difference in the 
number of independent variables.  
If the coefficient of determination shows that the model describes the data accurately, the p-
values for regression coefficients can then assess if they are significant (p < 0.05) or not (p > 
0.05). Regression coefficients are the extent to which variations of a specific independent 
variable change the value of the dependent variable. 
Additionally, the Pearson correlation coefficients tell whether the dependent and independent 
variables are negatively or positively correlated, or, alternatively, not related at all. The 
correlation coefficient ranges from -1 to 1 and signals pure negative linearity at -1, no linearity at 
zero and pure positive linearity at 1. A Fisher r-to-z transformation then assigns Z-values to the 
difference between correlation coefficients, thereby testing the significance of the difference 
between the coefficients.74 A Z-value of 1.64 signals a statistically significant difference between 
coefficients with a p-value of 0.05. This analysis indicates the statistical significance of the 
difference between explanatory power of several variables.  
Still, the model itself will always remain a proof of a correlation and not necessarily of a causal 
relation. However, the right selection and processing of data in combination with lessons from 
the literature ensures that these correlations approximate the qualitative truth as accurately as 
possible. 
  
                                                 
74 Xiao-Li Meng, Robert Rosenthal, and Donald B Rubin, "Comparing Correlated Correlation Coefficients," Psychological bulletin 111, no. 1 (1992); 
N Clayton Silver and William P Dunlap, "Averaging Correlation Coefficients: Should Fisher's Z Transformation Be Used?," Journal of Applied 
Psychology 72, no. 1 (1987). 
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Data selection  
The data-selection is categorised into three phases: baseline data, data on the dependent variable 
and data on the independent variable. The baseline data merely processes and categorises all 
other data and therefore has no influence or relevance for the actual results. Data on the 
independent variable describes the data on the dependent variable. The created regression 
models show how the latter correlates to the former. This section goes through all the decisions 
concerning selection, collection and processing of these variables.  
Baseline data 
Baseline data forms a framework to process raw data into the independent variables. As the 
sixty-three counties form the statistical units, one type of baseline data describes the 
administrative boundaries of these counties as established in 2009 and confirmed by the UN 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see Figure 1).75 The number of data 
entries is thus fixed at sixty-three, which is sufficiently high to run regression models. The 
surface area of each county is also calculated from the area that the counties’ boundary encloses. 
This area averages other data out to produce variables as population density.  
Data on population and population density divides out the impact that population has on results. 
Logically violence is more likely to occur in densely populated areas. Dividing independent 
variables by population can offset these effects. The used data is taken from the Gridded 
Population of the World dataset of the year 2000, published by NASA.76 The dataset forms a 
heat map of the world, subdivided into grid cells of one square kilometre. Every pixel value of 
the heat map indicates the total population of that square kilometre. The dataset is clipped to 
the size of Darfur and then all the pixels within each county are summated to calculate the total 
population per county. Dividing the population by the surface area of the county gives the 
population density per county in Figure 2. 
                                                 
75  OCHA Sudan, "Sudan - Administrative Boundaries (1 and 2)," UN OCHA, https://data.humdata.org/dataset/sudan-administrative-
boundaries. 
76 Erin Doxsey-Whitfield et al., "Taking Advantage of the Improved Availability of Census Data: A First Look at the Gridded Population of the 
World, Version 4," Papers in Applied Geography 1, no. 3 (2015). 
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Figure 2: Population density per county in Darfur 
The dependent variable  
The selection of the dependent variable is a crucial element of the research design as well. This 
study uses unique geo-coded data on 9.183 villages in Darfur gathered by the U.S government.77 
The data collection aimed to substantiate the priorities of humanitarian agencies. The data 
marks each village as destroyed, damaged or intact. A village is ‘destroyed’ when more than half 
of its structures are destroyed and ‘damaged’ when less than half of its structures are destroyed. 
The data clearly shows the horrific intensity of the used violence. Eventually, in 2010, almost 
forty percent of all villages were destroyed or damaged. Figure 3 also shows that the violence 
was most severe in the first years of the conflict and its intensity reduced significantly after 2007, 
when the first UN peacekeeping was deployed. 
 
Figure 3: The status (cumulative) of all of Darfur’s villages through time. 
                                                 
77 Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen, "The Us Government Darfur Genocide Investigation," Journal of Genocide Research 7, no. 2 (2005); U.S. 
Department of State - Humanitarian Information Unit, "Darfur Damaged and Destroyed Villages," U.S. Government, 
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/darfur-damaged-and-destroyed-villages. 
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Alongside its geographical position and its status, the data describes the number of destroyed 
structures per village, the total number of structures per village and the approximate year in 
which of the destruction. The data incorporates all confirmed events between February 2003 
and December 2010, when fresh peace talks between rebels and central Sudanese government 
started. This same timeframe will thus apply to the validity of the results. The conclusions thus 
do not necessarily apply to any dynamics prior or after this time window.  
This data shows both the temporal and the spatial variation of the violence. An analysis of the 
temporal variation of the violence, with the year of destruction as the dependent variable, would 
require temporal variation within the independent variables as well. Time-dependent effects as 
migration fluxes or varying presence of humanitarian aid workers would have to be mapped on 
multiple moments during the conflict. However, a first scan of the data on all Darfur’s villages 
shows some temporal variation, which forms an interesting starting point for future research 
(see left of Figure 4). An analysis of temporal variation of the violence could give insights into 
the effects of the deployment of a peacekeeping mission and the effect of humanitarian 
organisations. For now, conducting a temporal analysis is far beyond the scope of this research 
and would simply be setting up for failure.  
 
Figure 4: Left: the location of all damaged and destroyed villages coloured on the basis of the year of the attacks. Right: the 
location of all villages coloured on the basis of their status. 
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Therefore, this study chooses to analyse the spatial variation of the severity of violence per 
county, thereby excluding all temporal elements. The most logical measure for the severity of 
violence is the percentage of structures that were destroyed: 
𝑦𝑖 =  (
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗 
𝑗=𝑚
𝑗=0
∑ 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗 
𝑗=𝑚
𝑗=0
)
𝑖
  , 
in which each village j is a part of a larger collection of m villages in county i.  
This dependent variable yi would have several strengths. Firstly, the variable accounts for the 
number of structures in villages that were not attacked. Secondly, this variable offsets 
disturbances via population sizes as counties with a large population have more structures as 
well. Without this offset, the population is likely to blur the correlation as logically violence 
concentrates more in populated than desolated areas.  
Sadly, this dependent variable is not obtainable from the data in our dataset, as the number of 
structures per village is only known for 2.707 out of 9.183 villages, roughly thirty percent. As the 
villages with an unknown number of structures are mainly undamaged and heterogeneously 
distributed over the region, analysing only the remaining 2.707 villages would infect the whole 
model with a strong selection bias. To mitigate this problem, a new variable is introduced. The 
percentage of destroyed structures within each village j is now denoted as:   
𝜑𝑗 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑗
. 
When no data on the number of structures is available for that specific village, the φ comes to 
depend on the status of the village, using the fact that every village is categorised into ‘no 
damage’, ‘damaged’ or ‘destroyed’ (see Figure 5). When a village j is marked as ‘No Damage’, φj 
equals zero. When a village j is ‘Damaged’, φ assumes the average value of φ for all damaged 
villages with data on structures, so that φj = 0.407. Completely destroyed villages get assigned φj 
= 0.964, the average φ of all ‘destroyed’ villages with data on structures. In this way, missing 
data points are filled up, without altering the distribution of the original data. 
29 
 
 
Figure 5: Decision tree for calculation of φ 
As this φj is calculated per village, it still needs to be generalised to the county-level. To do so, 
the φ-values of all villages m in each county i are summated. To then account for different 
population sizes per county, the summated φ-value is divided by the population of county i  
(Popi) to obtain the eventual dependent variable yi:  
𝑦𝑖 =  
∑  𝜑 𝑗
𝑗=𝑚
𝑗=0
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖
 
Figure 6 shows the distribution of y over Darfur. It is remarkable that nine counties have 
experienced no violence whatsoever. Furthermore, it seems that the violence was mostly 
concentrated in Central and West Darfur.    
 
Figure 6: Distribution of y over Darfur’s counties. The colour classes are divided into equal counts. 
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Data for alternative explanations 
Now that the base-line data and the dependent variable are discussed, the focus must shift 
towards the independent variables. Two sets of independent variables are used; one for ethnicity 
and one for resource scarcity.  
Ethnicity  
The Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa (FMZ) tribes constituted the main targets of governmental 
marginalisation over the last centuries. Before that, these non-Arab tribes were the rich, 
privileged and ruling tribes of Darfur. These tribes are also the ones from which the rebellion 
recruited their support. If ethnicity explains the severity of violence in Darfur, the population 
density of these three tribes would be a strong predictor of the severity of violence. The 
hypothesis is thus that the more densely counties are inhabited by an FMZ-population, the 
more severe the violence in that county is.78  
Several data sources had to be combined to calculate EFMZ,i, the FMZ-population density in 
county i. The GeoEPR dataset presented the boundaries of the ethnic territories of minorities.79 
This dataset with global coverage has geo-coded every ethnic group on a map. Due to the 
absence of dataset specifically focusing on Darfur, this global map is the state-of-the-art 
concerning ethnic boundaries in the region. Where other global dataset’s boundaries are strictly 
separate, GeoEPR allows for the presence of multiple ethnicities in a single location. For the 
FMZ-groups, the data of the GeoEPR claims to be valid between 1956 and 2013, thus also 
during the time of the Darfur genocide. As this dataset excludes refugee fluxes or changes in 
identity, the presented ethnic boundaries are assumed to have been constant throughout the 
conflict.  
GeoEPR thus provides polygons and surface areas in which the FMZ-population lives. The 
population count of each tribe comes from the Joshua Project. 80  As it is intrinsically 
troublesome to count how many people identify with an ethnic group, these estimates are one 
of the few available data sources. The FMZ-population counts are from 2014 and thus do not 
correspond to the counts of 2003. However, these effects are neglected, as the focus is the 
distribution of EFMZ rather than its exact value.  
                                                 
78 See the literature review and the introduction of this thesis for a full description of the role of ethnicity and, especially, the role of Fur, 
Massaleit and Zaghawa tribes in Darfur. Additional information can be found in: Boggero; De Waal, "Who Are the Darfurians? Arab and 
African Identities, Violence and External Engagement."  
79 Julian Wucherpfennig et al., "Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups across Space and Time: Introducing the Geoepr Dataset " Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 28, no. 5 (2011). 
80 "Joshua Project: Sudan," Joshua Project, https://joshuaproject.net/countries/SU. 
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Several steps and assumptions are made to further process the data towards an analysable 
variable. The calculations assume that each ethnic population is distributed homogeneously over 
each associated polygon. This assumption simplifies the computation of EFMZ significantly as 
now there is a linear dependency between area and population. Although this assumption does 
not describe reality accurately, it allows for calculation of EFMZ, which approximates the truth 
better than alternatives such as a dummy variable (0 or 1) for the presence of ethnic groups.  
Now, the total FMZ-population per county can be calculated through a simple method. First, 
the total area of each FMZ-polygon is calculated. Then, per county, the area that each FMZ-
polygon covers is calculated. When an FMZ-polygon completely covers a county, this area will 
equal the county’s area. When a county has no overlap with any FMZ-polygon, this area will 
equal zero. The FMZ-population in county i of a total of j counties is then calculated as follows:  
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐹𝑀𝑍,𝑖 =
𝐴𝐹,𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝐹,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0  
∗ ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝐹,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0 +
𝐴𝑀,𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑀,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0  
∗ ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑀,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0 +
𝐴𝑍,𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑍,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0  
∗ ∑ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑍,𝑖
𝑖=𝑗
𝑖=0  , 
in which Pop denotes population and A is the surface area. To compute EFMZ,i, the FMZ-
population in a county is simply divided by that county’s surface area. Figure 7 shows the spatial 
variation of EFMZ,i over Darfur. The dimensions of EFMZ,i do not merely approximate actual 
numbers as the total population of Fur, Massaleit or Zaghawa is very hard to measure and as 
several assumptions were necessary to arrive at these figures. Furthermore, EFMZ cannot 
distinguish between violence against Fur, Massaleit or Zaghawa groups, as it is a summation 
over these three groups. Despite these limitations, Figure 7 gives a good representation of the 
relative distribution of the FMZ-population over Darfur’s counties. 
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Figure 7: FMZ-population density per county in Darfur, measured in FMZ-population per square degree of surface 
As an additional measure of ethnic tensions, the minimal distance from each county to the 
centroid of the closest ethnic polygon (Fur, Massaleit or Zaghawa) is calculated. This DFMZ gives 
an indication of the proximity of each county to possible ethnic tensions. The hypothesis is that 
the severity of violence increases when a county is closer to an ethnic centroid. Because we are 
focusing on positive predictors to y, Figure 8 shows the inverted distance instead of the regular 
distance.  
 
Figure 8: The distance between counties and the centres of areas with FMZ-population. 
33 
 
Marginalisation along ethnic lines, as an integral part of the theory on ethnicity, is excluded from 
this analysis for several reasons. Firstly, the effect of marginalisation on the severity of violence 
is very indirect. Including variables for marginalisation would essentially hypothesise that these 
variables can predict ethnic divisions, which then predicts the severity of the violence. Yet, other 
reasons for the marginalisation of specific counties in Darfur other than just ethnicity might 
exist; ecological, historical or institutional factors can also significantly influence observable 
implications of marginalisation as infant mortality, literacy rates, malnutrition or poverty.  
Secondly, although variables of marginalisation indirectly describe the severity of violence, its 
variables could also make opposite hypotheses very plausible. Take, as an example, the access to 
infrastructure, quantified as the kilometres of road per square kilometre per inhabitant. For this 
variable, two opposite hypotheses are both plausible. Access to infrastructure can affect the 
severity of violence negatively, assuming that counties with worse access to infrastructure are 
more marginalised, which increases the likelihood that people from FMZ-tribes inhabit the 
county and thus the county would experience severer violence; a very indirect and unwieldy 
hypothesis. An opposite effect of access to infrastructure is also plausible: the better people’s 
access to infrastructure in a county, the better the militia’s access to the people, the severer the 
violence. There is thus no clear and direct hypothesis that ties observable implications of 
marginalisation to the severity of violence. 
Thirdly, data on marginalisation is scarce and not available in the right resolutions. Data on 
inequality, poverty, malnutrition, literacy rates, gender equality or access to education, health 
care or judicial support is only available as a single figure for Darfur, thus not differentiating for 
different counties. Because of these three reasons, the explanatory power of ethnicity is only 
tested on the basis of the EFMZ and DFMZ.  
Resource scarcity 
The literature suggests that resource scarcity is another main contributor to Darfur’s violence. 
The regression model for this theory comprises two sets of variables. The first set of 
independent variables describes the resource scarcity as each county’s population experiences it.  
Again, limited availability of data heavily influences the decisions on independent variables to 
represent the observable implications of this theory. Variables for land capture or theft of 
livestock would describe the motivation of militiamen most directly, but such data is unavailable. 
Furthermore, data on food scarcity is not available in a sufficient resolution and data on 
population growth is only available for years after the conflict. Therefore, this research 
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quantifies the availability of water, the fertility of soil and the severity of droughts for people in 
each county as independent variables. The hypothesis around these variables is always: if there is 
more competition around resources in a county, then the violence in that county will be severer.  
The data used to describe water scarcity comes from the Aqueduct Global Maps of the World 
Resource Institute.81 This data is organised along boundaries that relate to hydrological areas as 
basins, rivers, deserts or wadis, delivering a sufficiently high resolution to average out this data 
towards the county-level. Amongst others, this data maps the Baseline Water Stress (BWS), 
which measures the total annual water withdrawal as a percentage of the total amount of 
available blue water (see left of Figure 9). A high BWS indicates high competition amongst users 
and would correlate with a high severity of violence according to our hypothesis.  
Furthermore, the right of Figure 9 presents an index for the severity of droughts. This Drought 
Severity Index (DSI) is calculated from a variable M in the raw data, which is the mean length of 
droughts multiplied with the severity of droughts. This variable M is then corrected for the 
county’s total population and surface area, to measure the competition amongst the local 
population, so that the DSI is high when competition over water is high and many people 
experience extreme drought in a small patch of land:  
𝐷𝑆𝐼i =
𝑀i ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝i
𝐴i
 
 
Figure 9: BWS in all counties of Darfur (left) and the DSI (right).  
                                                 
81  Francis Gassert et al., "Aqueduct Global Maps 2.1: Constructing Decision-Relevant Global Water Risk Indicators," in Working Paper 
(Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2014). 
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Soil fertility is the main determinant for the opportunity to cultivate land for agriculture, thus 
also for the value and potential of land. The associated hypothesis claims that counties with 
fertile soil face more competition over land and will thus have severer violence.  
The soil fertility is measured via data on vegetation. Several studies suggest a causal relation 
between the two; if the vegetation is denser, then the soil is more fertile as well.82 The data 
comes from the Normalised Difference Vegetation Index, as mapped by the NASA Earth 
Observatory.83 The data shows the vegetation on grid cells of one hundred square kilometres for 
February 2003; the month in which the documentation of the severity of violence started. The 
data comes in a high resolution and is first averaged over the surface area of each county. Then, 
the population density of each county is divided by its vegetation index to express the 
competition over the fertile soil in a new index. This new Soil Competition Index (SCI) is thus 
high when many people have to share a small patch of barren soil. Figure 10 plots the SCI per 
county.  
 
Figure 10: Soil Competition Index. The whiter counties show counties where the competition over fertile soil is fiercer.  
  
                                                 
82 Patricia Guidão Cruz Ruggiero et al., "Soil-Vegetation Relationships in Cerrado (Brazilian Savanna) and Semideciduous Forest, Southeastern 
Brazil," Plant Ecology 160, no. 1 (2002); D. D. Eni, A. I. Iwara, and R. A. Offiong, "Analysis of Soil-Vegetation Interrelationships in a South-
Southern Secondary Forest of Nigeria," International Journal of Forestry Research 2012 (2012). 
83  John Weier and David Herring, "Measuring Vegetation (Ndvi & Evi)," NASA's Earth Observatory Group, 
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/MeasuringVegetation/. 
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The second set of variables describes the role of oil per county. This set indicates the 
importance of each county’s resources to the central government, rather than to the local 
population. Two indicators measure the importance of oil per county, both originating from 
United States Agency for International Development.84 The presence of oil production sites is a 
dummy variable, with each zero indicating an absence and each one indicating an oil production 
site within that county (Noilpsite).  
The second variable for the relevance of oil is calculated through the oil concession zones. Oil 
concession zones are areas of which the government obtained the rights to explore and produce 
oil. To process these areas into useful data, all polygons are first combined into one. Then, the 
percentage of each county’s surface that overlaps with oil concession areas is calculated (Poil). 
Figure 11 summarises the distribution of Poil in Darfur, a good indication of each county’s 
relevance in the central government’s plans to explore and produce oil.  
 
Figure 11: The percentage of each county that is covered by oil concession areas (Poil), for whole of Darfur.  
                                                 
84 Geosprocket LLC, "An Assessment of Existing Spatial Data in South Sudan," USAID Global Environment Management Support Program, 
https://github.com/GeoSprocket/ssudan-eco. 
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To conclude, we expect the severity of the violence (y) to be a function of variables that describe 
the observable implications of two alternative theories: ethnicity and resource scarcity. Both sets 
of variables are tested in two separate regression models. The first model aims to test if violence 
resulted from ethnic tensions and accounts for FMZ-population density (EFMZ) and the inverse 
distance between counties and the closest ethnic centre (DFMZ). In further use, this model is 
presented as Model 1:  
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0,𝑎 + 𝛽1,𝑎𝐸𝐹𝑀𝑍,i + 𝛽2,𝑎𝐷𝐹𝑀𝑍,i +  𝜀. 
The second model aims to tie the severity of violence to resource scarcity, with the Baseline 
Water Stress (BWS), the Drought Severity Index (DSI), the competition over fertile soil (SCI), 
the coverage by oil concession areas (Poil) and the number of oil production sites (Noilpsite). In 
further use, this model is presented as Model 2:  
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0,𝑏 + 𝛽1,𝑏𝐵𝑊𝑆i + 𝛽2,𝑏𝐷𝑅𝑂i + 𝛽3,𝑏𝑆𝐶𝐼i + 𝛽4,𝑏𝑃oil,i +  𝛽5,𝑏𝑁oil,i + 𝜀. 
In both models, ε is a small number indicating small random errors that deviate from the linear 
relation; the β’s are the regression coefficients of which β0 accounts for any violence when all 
other variables assume a value of zero. The models thus suggest a linear relation between the 
regression coefficients and the dependent variables, in which all the independent variables 
contribute to the severity of violence. The comparison of results for both regression models can 
answer the research question and thus show if the Darfur genocide was primarily a campaign of 
ethnic cleansing, a struggle over scarce resources or both.  
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The following section presents and compares the results of the two regression models. All 
presented results apply to the standardised variables. Although many additional conclusions and 
observations can be made on basis of the presented data, this thesis only discusses contributions 
to the main research question.  
Model accuracy 
Table 1 shows the coefficients of determination for both models. The coefficients show a 
relatively weak fit of the regression model to the dependent variable for Model 1. The value of 
R2 shows that merely 32.9% of the variance in y is predictable from variance in the independent 
variables. Yet R2 values above 50% are rare in sciences aiming to describe human behaviour. 
Table 1: The model accuracy of Model 1 and Model 2 
 
Model 2 describes variances in the severity of violence even less adequately. To compare two 
models with a different number of input variables, the adjusted R2-value must be evaluated. The 
adjusted R2-values show that Model 1 can account for more of the variance in the severity of 
violence than Model 2 does. Therefore, variables for ethnic tensions seem to have more 
explanatory power towards the severity of violence than variables for resource scarcity do, 
although the gap is minimal. This gap closes further when the variables that account for the 
presence of oil are discarded (see Appendix A). This shows that the variables of oil harm the 
accuracy and precision of Model 2. The presence of oil does not seem to be a good predictor of 
the severity of violence in Darfur.  
 R R2 Adjusted R2 Standard Error of Estimation 
Model 1  0.574 0.329 0.307 0.833 
Model 2  0.550 0.302 0.241 0.871 
 
39 
 
Residual plots and normality checks 
Normal P-P plots check normality assumption, which dictates that errors around the expected 
values should be distributed normally. Figure 12 shows no major reason for concern.  
 
Figure 12: Normal P-P plot of Regression Standardised Residual for Model 1 (left) and Model 2 (right) 
Residual plots form an additional check on the normality assumption and if a linear model is 
appropriate. The points should form a random pattern around the line y = 0, and especially 
between -0.75 < x < 0.75. This seems to be the case although there are more positive than 
negative outliers. The plots are slightly imbalanced around the y-axis, although not worryingly 
much. Both models show large amounts of heteroscedasticity, implying that residuals get larger 
as the standardised predicted value increases. The models are thus more ‘off’ as the severity of 
violence increases. This is not an inherent problem, but merely a sign that the model leaves 
room for improvements through normalising the errors via appropriate variable transformation. 
However, these kinds of transformations are beyond the scope of this research and, additionally, 
severely complicate the interpretation of the regression’s results.85 The plots do not show non-
linearity. Overall, these two figures show that a linear model is appropriate and roughly 
conforms to the normality assumption. 
                                                 
85 A seemingly appropriate transformation would be the Box-Cox transformation: Jason W Osborne, "Improving Your Data Transformations: 
Applying the Box-Cox Transformation," Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation 15, no. 12 (2010). 
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Figure 13: Standard residual plots of Model 1 (left) and Model 2 (right) 
Pearson correlations coefficients  
The Pearson correlations coefficients show the linearity of the correlation between different 
variables. If the coefficients is more extreme (-1 or 1), a linear relation captures the data more 
accurately. This, however, does not ensure that this linearity can be quantified in a regression 
coefficient, as we will see later. Because all variables are standardised, the Pearson coefficient is 
equal to the regression coefficient and to R in the scenario that the regression model only 
consists of the corresponding independent variable and y. Therefore, discrepancies between the 
Pearson coefficient and the regression coefficients show how other independent variables in the 
model impact the correlation of a specific variable to y. Comparing the Pearson coefficient thus 
gives a good indicator of the strength of individual correlations.  
As expected, an increase of ethnic variables leads to a significant increase in the severity of 
violence. Table 2 shows that the coefficient between y and EFMZ is by far the largest of all, 
meaning that the impact of EFMZ on the severity of violence is the most linear and the most 
positive. The coefficient between y and DFMZ is less positive.  
Coefficients for Model 2 show several unexpected results. Firstly, it was expected that resource 
scarcity would increase the severity of violence, but the Pearson coefficients do not subscribe 
this hypothesis unambiguously. Some coefficients are negative while they were expected to be 
positive contributors to the severity of violence. SCI, for instance, has a negative correlation to 
the severity of violence. This suggests, in contrast to our hypothesis, that when more people 
have to share a smaller patch of more barren soil, the violence will become less severe. An 
alternative variable, which increases as more people share a smaller patch of fertile soil instead of 
arid soil, was tested as well but did not significantly alter the results (see Appendix B). An 
alternative hypothesis thus might be more applicable to understand the relation between soil 
competition and severity of violence.  
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Several other coefficients are insignificant and thus no conclusion can be drawn from them. In 
addition, Table 2 shows that there is no relation between the severity of violence and the 
number of oil sites, as the coefficient of determination for Model 2 without oil variables had 
already suggested. In conclusion, the results from Model 2 are ambiguous and do not conform 
to earlier hypotheses. The exception is BWS, whose coefficients are both positive and significant. 
Table 2: Pearson correlation coefficient between all variables, with y in bold and insignificant coefficients (p > 0.005) in red 
 
The coefficient of determination already showed that Model 1 describes the data more 
accurately than Model 2 does. In addition to that, the Pearson coefficients thus show that EFMZ 
of Model 1 is the strongest positive contributor to the severity of violence, while the coefficients 
of Model 2 show ambiguity and disarray. Further evaluation must show if the difference 
between the coefficients of EFMZ and other variables is indeed significant.  
Regression Coefficients  
The Pearson coefficients had already shown that both variables in Model 1 are positive 
contributors to the severity of violence. The Pearson coefficients also showed that EFMZ has a 
stronger linear relation to y than DFM. Table 3 confirms these two findings; the regression 
coefficient for EFMZ is again the largest of all while the regression coefficient for DFMZ is not 
significant at all. Yet, a separate analysis on the change in R2 when the variables of Model 1 are 
added to the model one by one also shows that both variables are significant contributors to the 
model’s fit (see Appendix C). 
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Table 3: Regression coefficients for Model 1 and Model 2 
 
For several reasons, the regression coefficients for Model 2 are again ambiguous. First, three of 
the regression coefficients are not significant (DSI, Poil, Noilpsite), of which two also had an 
insignificant Pearson coefficient. From these results conclude that droughts and the presence of 
oil do not have a measurable impact on the severity of violence.   
The only significant contributors to Model 2 are BWS and SCI. Opposed to our hypothesis but 
conform its Pearson coefficient, SCI correlates negatively to y. For BWS the correlation to y is 
positive as expected. A separate analysis, which records the change that occurs to R2 when the 
variables of Model 2 are added to the model one at a time, also shows that BWS and SCI are the 
only significant contributors to the model (see Appendix D). 
The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in Table 3 measures the multicollinearity between the 
variables. As the VIFs for all variables are lower than three, thereby these models conform to 
one of the main assumptions of a linear regression, namely that variables must be linearly 
independent.  
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Discussion 
On the basis of these results, the impacts of several variables on the severity of violence are 
deemed insignificant or non-existing (DFMZ, DSI, Poil and Noilpsite). The results for SCI do not 
agree with prior hypotheses. As this discrepancy erodes the qualitative value of any conclusion, 
this variable is excluded from further analyses as well. Table 4 summarises the remaining 
variables, both positive and significant contributors to their respective models.  
Table 4: Comparison of significant regression coefficients 
 
To compare the predictive power of these two variables more directly, both variables are added 
stepwise to a new regression model, Model 3. The coefficient of determination is recorded for 
EFMZ solely first and then again for both variables after the addition of BWS to the new model. 
The same procedure is repeated with opposite sequence of addition of the variables (first BWS 
and then EFMZ).  
Table 5 shows that for the first sequence, the addition of BWS does not contribute to the 
model’s accuracy, as the change in R2 is insignificant. In the second sequence, despite BWS’s 
advantage of being added first, the addition of EFMZ improves the model a lot. Comparing the 
R2-change of 3c and 3d shows that the addition of EFMZ improves the model more than the 
addition of BWS to an empty model. This shows that EFMZ totally dominates the explanatory 
power of this combined model.  
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Table 5a: Summaries of the coefficients of determination for different models. 
 
Table 6 presents the regression coefficients for this new model. These coefficients confirm the 
dominance of EFMZ in the new model as the regression coefficient for BWS is insignificant. Yet 
again, the regression coefficient for EFMZ is the sole contributor to the explanatory power of the 
new regression model. Also note that the Pearson coefficients with y have not changed 
compared to early models as we are dealing with standardised variables. 
Table 6: Summary of key coefficients of Model 3 
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A final comparison of the two Pearson coefficients for EFMZ and BWS (rFMZ and rBWS) can add 
further significance to the dominant role of EFMZ in predicting the severity of violence. The 
hypothesis for this comparison is that rFMZ > rBWS. The hypothesis is accepted with a one-tailed 
significance level of 0.05 when the Z-score for the comparison of the Zcomparison > 1.64. A 
Fischer r-to-z-transformation allows for a comparison of rFMZ and rBWS.
86 The transformation is 
relatively easy to perform: 
𝑧 =
1
2
∗ ln (
1 + 𝑟
1 − 𝑟
) 
The two Z-scores that are obtained from this equation are then filled into the following 
equation, which computes Zcomparison: 
𝑍comparison =
(𝑧1−𝑧2)
√
1
N1−3
+
1
N2−3
,  
with N1 and N2 being the sample sizes, i.e. the number of counties. This Z-score assesses the 
significance of the difference between two Pearson coefficients. For our coefficients, Zcomparison = 
1.59, just below the critical value of 1.64. As Zcomparison < 1.64, our hypothesis that rFMZ > rBWS 
with a one-tailed significance level of 0.05 must be rejected. Instead, the hypothesis rFMZ > rBWS 
has a significance level of 0.056.  
                                                 
86 Clayton Silver and William Dunlap, "Averaging Correlation Coefficients: Should Fisher's R-to-Z Transformation Be Used?," Journal of Applied 
Psychology 72, no. 1 (1987). 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The most incredible number regarding this research is that the war in Darfur has devastated the 
lives of millions of people. Scholarly interest, arising from these atrocities, has suggested four 
theories that explain the causes of the violence in Darfur. As these theories are not mutually 
exclusive, weighing and comparing them has been problematic. On the basis of geo-coded data, 
this thesis offers a statistical comparison between two of the explanations for the violence in 
Darfur: ethnicity and resource scarcity. Simply put, the main research question is: which of two 
explanations, ethnicity or resource scarcity, contributed more to the root causes of the violence 
in Darfur?  
The research design statistically ties observable implications of the selected theories to the 
severity of violence in Darfur. In this statistical analysis, the independent variables describe 
these observable implications and the dependent variable is the severity of violence. Data on 
these variables is collected and calculated for each of the sixty-three counties of Darfur, which 
are the statistical units of this research. Seven independent variables and a single dependent 
variable are correlated in two linear regression models, one for each explanation. The accuracy, 
strength and precision of the two models can then reveal identify the main contributor to the 
violence in Darfur; ethnicity, resource scarcity, both or neither.  
This research design has many benefits as it is objective and allows for a unique combination of 
publicly available, geo-coded data. Yet, it has obvious limitations as well. Firstly, the literature 
showed that both selected theories have gathered widespread academic support. The literature 
also exposed the main limitation of the research, namely that the two untested explanations are 
equally plausible. The limited availability of data compelled the exclusion of the other two 
theories, but a more comprehensive study should also include variables on counter-insurgency 
and intra-elite rivalry.  
The low availability of data severely limits this research in other ways as well. The data scarcity 
has forced choices for variables that indirectly describe the theories’ observable implications, as 
data for a more direct description was unavailable. In addition, the data scarcity necessitates 
assumptions in the processing and calculation of variables.  
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Despite its benefits and limitations, the research design partly answers the research question. 
The evidence is not demonstrative, but it is probable that the model for ethnicity (Model 1) 
better predicts the severity of violence than the model for resource scarcity (Model 2) does. 
Several statistical arguments underpin this conclusion. Firstly, according to the coefficients of 
determination, Model 1 better describes variances in the severity of violence better than Model 
2. Secondly, the Pearson coefficients for Model 1 are positive and significant, while the same 
coefficients for Model 2 are either negative or insignificant, with the exception of BWS. This 
tells that variables for Model 1 have a stronger positive linearity to the severity of violence than 
variables for Model 2. 
The regression coefficients tell a similar story. The regression coefficient of EFMZ is the largest 
of all variables, but the regression coefficient of DFMZ is insignificant. Regression coefficients of 
Model 2 show a similar trend as the Pearson coefficients of Model 2; regression coefficients are 
either negative or insignificant, with the exception of BWS. While the insignificant coefficients 
identify variables that do not impact the severity of violence, the negative coefficients 
demonstrate inconsistencies with prior hypotheses. The prior hypotheses expected that when 
resources are scarcer, violence would be severer. Instead, some coefficients suggest that violence 
is less severe when resources are scarcer. The literature revealed similar discrepancies; some 
studies proved a correlation between resource scarcity and violence while others dismissed those 
conclusions.87 The discrepancies with the hypotheses and the insignificance other coefficients 
put serious doubts on the explanatory power of Model 2 as a whole. Apparently, variables of 
Model 2 cannot be quantitatively or qualitatively tied to the severity of violence.  
The only positive and significant contributor to Model 2 is the BWS. So overall, only EFMZ and 
BWS have significant and positive Pearson coefficients and regression coefficients. To directly 
compare their predictive power to the severity of violence, both variables are combined into a 
single new model: Model 3. BWS’s contribution to Model 3 falls into insignificance when 
compared to EFMZ’s contribution. Model 3 thus relies heavily on EFMZ for its accuracy and fit.  
  
                                                 
87 See page 10: Brown. De Juan. Kevane and Gray; Butler. 
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The Pearson coefficient for EFMZ (rFMZ) seemed larger than Pearson coefficients for BWS (rBWS) 
and all other variables. However, the Fisher r-to-z-transformation and the succeeding 
comparison of the Z-scores, show that the difference between rFMZ and rBWS is only significant 
with a p-score of 0.056, just above the pre-determined significance level of 0.05. The hypothesis 
rFMZ > rBWS is thus rejected. Therefore, the conclusion that ethnicity explains more of the 
severity of violence than resource scarcity lacks a closing piece of statistical evidence.  
Finally, the previously formulated hypotheses are reassessed. Regarding those hypotheses, this 
statistical analysis concludes that the severity of violence (i) indeed increases with the population 
density of Fur, Massaleit and Zaghawa tribes, (ii) might increase with the counties’ proximity to 
ethnic centres, (iii) is not significantly impacted by resource scarcity (with exception of BWS) 
and (iv) is not significantly impacted by the presence of oil.  
Overall, ethnicity is probably, but not definitely, a stronger predictor of the severity of violence 
than resource scarcity. The coefficients of determination, the Pearson coefficients, the 
regression coefficient, the discrepancies and inconsistencies of Model 2, the results for Model 3 
and the reassessment of the primary hypotheses all point into that direction. Although all 
statistical analyses point towards ethnicity - and especially EFMZ - as the strongest predictor, the 
final evidence is inconclusive as the difference between Pearson coefficients for EFMZ and BWS 
is statistically insignificant. 
Apart from this main conclusion, the research elucidates interesting individual correlations. 
According to this research, the presence of oil and the severity of droughts have been irrelevant 
to this war. The significantly negative correlation between SCI and the severity of violence 
shows that violence is more severe in areas where a few people share a lot of fertile land. These 
correlations could form a starting point for new qualitative research, focusing on the dynamics 
of violence in fertile, but desolated areas of Darfur.  
In retrospect, this research also unveils the complexity of the genocide in Darfur. It was very 
challenging to capture the dynamics of the genocide into variables, partly due to the limited 
availability of data. Despite many efforts, not a lot of data has a proper resolution and is publicly 
available and is trustworthy and is geo-coded. Therefore, on-the-ground surveys and population 
counts would benefit analyses of the Darfur genocide. Although many scholars have conducted 
surveys and counts, none of them has disclosed their data in usable formats. 88 Research with a 
longer timespan can aim to set up a data-sharing platform, to optimally benefit from all available 
                                                 
88 Hagan and Kaiser; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, "The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal Victimization in 
Darfur."; Darfur and the Crime of Genocide; Jennifer Leaning MD. 
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knowledge. Furthermore, an increased timespan might also allow researchers to access data that 
is not publicly available. As the dust on the Darfur genocide settles, more data will become 
available on the dynamics of the violence. Variables on land and cattle capture, changes of 
ethnic composition of counties or changes in the distribution of key positions in government 
could then shine new light on this genocide.  
Until now, the full potential of data in humanitarian crises is yet to be unravelled. But in the 
future, as data continues to becomes more abundant, available and determinative, these kinds of 
data-driven analyses might prove to be of paramount importance. Data-driven decision-making 
can ensure an adequate and fast response from the international community and can optimise 
the allocation of humanitarian organisations’ aid. In addition, it can serve as evidence for 
genocides and help to hold its killers accountable so that dictators like Omar Al-Bashir will not 
go unpunished and so that, in the future, genocides as Darfur’s will be a thing of the past. 
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APPENDIX A 
Comparison of Model 2 and Model 2 without variables for oil presence 
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APPENDIX B 
Comparison of Model 2 with the old SCI and the new SCI 
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APPENDIX C 
Overview of contribution of both variables of Model 1 to the overall fit of the model. 
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APPENDIX D 
Overview of contribution of all variables of Model 2 to the overall fit of the model. 
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